Wednesday 20 May 2020

Writing Windows File System Drivers is Hard.

A tweet by @jonasLyk reminded me of a bug I found in NTFS a few months back, which I've verified still exists in Windows 10 2004. As far as I can tell it's not directly usable to circumvent security but it feels like a bug which could be used in a chain. NTFS is a good demonstration of how complex writing a FS driver is on Windows, so it's hardly surprising that so many weird edges cases pop up over time.

The issue in this case was related to the default Security Descriptor (SD) assignment when creating a new Directory. If you understand anything about Windows SDs you'll know it's possible to specify the inheritance rules through either the CONTAINER_INHERIT_ACE and/or OBJECT_INHERIT_ACE ACE flags. These flags represent whether the ACE should be inherited from a parent directory if the new entry is either a Directory or a File. Let's look at the code which NTFS uses to assign security to a new file and see if you can spot the bug?

The code uses SeAssignSecurityEx to create the new SD based on the Parent SD and any explicit SD from the caller. For inheritance to work you can't specify an explicit SD, so we can ignore that. Whether SeAssignSecurityEx applies the inheritance rules for a Directory or a File depends on the value of the IsDirectoryObject parameter. This is set to TRUE if the FILE_DIRECTORY_FILE options flag was passed to NtCreateFile. That seems fine, you can't create a Directory if you don't specify the FILE_DIRECTORY_FILE flag, if you don't specify a flag then a File will be created by default.

But wait, that's not true at all. If you specify a name of the form ABC::$INDEX_ALLOCATION then NTFS will create a Directory no matter what flags you specify. Therefore the bug is, if you create a directory using the $INDEX_ALLOCATION trick then the new SD will inherit as if it was a File rather than a Directory. We can verifying this behavior on the command prompt.

C:\> mkdir ABC
C:\> icacls ABC /grant "INTERACTIVE":(CI)(IO)(F)
C:\> icacls ABC /grant "NETWORK":(OI)(IO)(F)

First we create a directory ABC and grant two ACEs, one for the INTERACTIVE group will inherit on a Directory, the other for NETWORK will inherit on a File.

C:\> echo "Hello" > ABC\XYZ::$INDEX_ALLOCATION
Incorrect function.

We then create the sub-directory XYZ using the $INDEX_ALLOCATION trick. We can be sure it worked as CMD prints "Incorrect function" when it tries to write "Hello" to the directory object.

C:\> icacls ABC\XYZ
ABC\XYZ NT AUTHORITY\NETWORK:(I)(F)
        NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:(I)(F)
        BUILTIN\Administrators:(I)(F)

Dumping the SD for the XYZ sub-directory we see the ACEs were inherited based on it being a File, rather than a Directory as we can see an ACE for NETWORK rather than for INTERACTIVE. Finally we list ABC to verify it really is a directory.

C:\> dir ABC
 Volume in drive C has no label.
 Volume Serial Number is 9A7B-865C

 Directory of C:\ABC

2020-05-20  19:09    <DIR>          .
2020-05-20  19:09    <DIR>          ..
2020-05-20  19:05    <DIR>          XYZ


Is this useful? Honestly probably not. The only scenario I could imagine it would be is if you can specify a path to a system service which creates a file in a location where inherited File access would grant access and inherited Directory access would not. This would allow you to create a Directory you can control, but it seems a bit of a stretch to be honest. If anyone can think of a good use for this let me or Microsoft know :-)

Still, it's interesting that this is another case where $INDEX_ALLOCATION isn't correctly verified where determining whether an object is a Directory or a File. Another good example was CVE-2018-1036, where you could create a new Directory with only FILE_ADD_FILE permission. Quite why this design decision was made to automatically create a Directory when using the stream type is unclear. I guess we might never know.